



# **The European Commission's Expert Groups**

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
Parliamentary Hearing 06/12/2011

# European Commission



# Quasi- monopoly of legislative initiative

- The Commission proposes around 100 legislative pieces per year and nearly all get adopted
- #1 target of lobbyists



# Commission drafts laws for half billion Europeans

- A big part of the legislation in force in the Member States has its origins in EU law and therefore the Commission.
- Commission is a small administration given the volume of its tasks. Particularly when compared with the size of national governments:  
Commission has 24,000 staff  
(32,000 including outsourced staff)  
Many French ministries have above 30,000.
- Only less than 12,000 AD officials actually deal with legislation.



# Has the Commission sufficient in-house knowledge basis?

- 3,500 staff working in the Commission's research and statistical facilities (Eurostat, RTD, JRC)
- 7,300 staff of the EU Agencies
- Research staff in various DGs




# Options to get external expertise

Commission may mobilise expertise from:

- Member States' experts
- Public universities and civil society
- The thousands of corporate lobbyists present in Brussels

ALTER-EU's assumption:  
Expertise deficit is the lobbyists' entry point



# Expert groups: the most widely used method to collect expertise

896 expert groups currently in the register

## **What do they do?**

They produce the first legislative and policy drafts

## **What is their composition?**

- Approx. 2/3 of them are composed purely of member states representatives
- Among the other ones 100 or more are controlled by corporations, trade associations etc. (May 2011 data)


# ALTER-EU findings and main concern

- In the policy areas or DGs covered by our research, representatives of corporations are always more numerous than all other non-state categories together
- Corporate-dominated groups are also more numerous than groups dominated by other non-state interests
- The problem is: Big business should not be given a privileged role in the drafting phase of EU legislation and policies
- Companies, trade associations etc. represent a tiny minority in society: corporations' shareholders

# State of play financial expert groups


- DG MARKT set up a new website on its expert groups. Info does not agree with what is on the register (11 vs 38)
- If data is clarified by the end of the year, that would mean a step in the right direction

Percentage of corporate representatives among non-government financial experts




# DG MARKT's version

Break-down of DG Markt Financial Services Expert Groups: Overview



# ALTER-EU's version

Non-governmental members of DG Markt Financial Services Expert Groups



# Stroghold of corporations in finance still not broken

- Tax Barriers Business Advisory Group (T-BAG):  
19 out of 22 members from corporations.
- Expert Group on Market Infrastructures (EGMI):  
31 out of 38 members from corporations.
- Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) group:  
6 out of 9 non-state members from corporations  
+ five national authorities
- The financial employees' group is made up of 18 trade-unionists. But is it as influential as the ones above?

# DG ENTR expert groups

Data collected in August 2011

Total DG ENTR expert groups: 85

- Groups including non-state stakeholders: 50
- Groups dominated by corporate interests: 31
- Groups dominated by academia-independent research: 5
- Groups dominated by SMEs: 2
- Groups with more or less balanced composition: 2

In terms of individual experts:

**454** corporate advisers and only **209** from all the other non-state categories together  
(consumers, environmentalists, employees etc.)

# DG CLIMA

5 groups:

4 corporate-dominated and

1 with academics only.

- 1. ECCP                Ships:                26**  
**corporations – 15 others**
- 2. HIGH-LEVEL-SHIPS: 9**  
**business – 4 others**
- 3. F-Gas: 25 business – 3**  
**NGOs**
- 4. Adaption to climate change:**  
**7 business – 5 others**
- 5. Tremove: 6 academics**

Total	158
Ministries and national authorities	71
Business	51
NGO	11
Others	16
EU	9

# Differences between Commission rules and EP demands (1)

- EP: ‘Prohibit a single interest category (...) from having the majority of the non-government and non-EU seats in any expert group. **Provide safeguards against capture** from special interests and corporate interests.’
- Com: ‘the Commission and its departments **shall aim at ensuring** a balanced representation of relevant areas of expertise and areas of interest (...) **while taking into account the specific tasks** of every particular expert group and the type of expertise required’

# Differences between Commission rules and EP demands (2)

- EP: **'Ban lobbyists and corporate executives sitting in expert groups in a 'personal capacity'**. The Commission should clarify whether members of an expert group are there as stakeholders or as experts committed to acting in the public interest. The second should **be thoroughly checked for conflicts of interest and their "declaration of professional activities" should be in the public domain.**
- COM: 'The Commission services concerned shall inform experts who are appointed in their personal capacity that, **by accepting to be members of the group, they commit themselves to act independently** and in the public interest. Commission services shall also inform those experts **that they may be excluded** from the group or a specific meeting thereof, **should a conflict of interest arise.**'
- ALTER-EU agrees with EP:  
Conflicts of Interest should be checked proactively.

# Differences between Commission rules and EP demands (3)

- EP: 'Common selection criteria throughout all DGs, that guarantee balance among different categories of stakeholders and absence of Conflict of Interests for experts and establish an obligatory open selection process with a public call and a published mandate of each expert group which goes beyond a simple representation of Member states authorities.'
- Commission has repeatedly refused any possibility of common rules.

# Good governance and administration principles should be implemented

## Provisions

- Article 9 of the Treaty of Lisbon:  
**‘the Union shall observe the principle of the equality of its citizens, who shall receive equal attention from its institutions, bodies, offices and agencies.’**
- The European Ombudsman’s European Code of Good Administrative Behaviour (Article 6):  
**‘When taking decisions, the official shall respect the fair balance between the interests of private persons and the general public interest.’**  
(Ombudsman to publish his ruling on expert groups soon)

## The Problem

- Commission’s Code of conduct on use of expertise and consultation standards talk about “balance” but do not provide the tools to safeguard it. Rules in place insufficient to implement the above-mentioned principles.

## The Solution

- There is a clear case for New rules on expert groups to be drafted in consultation with the Parliament.

# Parliament can do even more

- Article 298 of the Treaty  
“In carrying out their missions, the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union shall have the support of an open, efficient and **independent** European administration”.
- Parliament’s JURI Committee thinks of asking the Commission to present a proposal for a ‘**single general administrative law binding on the Union's institutions**’ that provides ‘a **minimum safety net of guarantees to citizens** and businesses in their direct dealings with the EU's administration’ (potentially including the preparation of legislation)
- The expert groups register should also be included in such an instrument (as is already the case with the lobby register)
- Safeguards (including procedural ones) against capture by a single interest category should be considered as a ‘minimum safety net’.

# Legitimacy of the Commission

- The Commission is seeing its powers increased (incl. power to amend national budgets)
- It is not any more just a market regulator
- It is not democratically elected but appointed
- It should increase its legitimacy by consulting all interests in society by:
  - breaking with phenomena of regulatory capture
  - abolishing the current primacy of corporations in the Commission's advisory structure.

# Change is urgent

- Four-point decrease in trust (40%) since autumn 2010 (2<sup>nd</sup> institution in fall after the Council)
- Commission from 52% in 2007 to 40%
- Trust in the EU has fallen from 57% in 2007 to 41% in spring 2011
- Distrust from 32% in 2007 to 47% (Eurobarometer)

# Thank you for your attention!



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