Legal study carried out by Markus Krajewski of the University of Erlangen-Nürnberg, conducted on behalf of the 'Kammer für Arbeiter und Angestellte für Wien (the Vienna Chamber of Labour)
A binding regulation of lobbying activities at the EU level including the requirement to register and to adhere to certain standards of behavior would be the most effective way of regulating these activities. Examples, in the EU, but also in third countries (US, Canada) show the variety of such mandatory approaches, but also their feasibility.
The legal basis for such a regulation can be found in Article 298 (2) TFEU concerning lobbyists which target EU institutions engaged in administrative tasks. Based on the implied powers doctrine, the EU’s competence could be extended to cover all activities addressing EU organs and institutions engaged in administrative as well as legislative tasks. A regulation based on Article 298 TFEU and/or the implied powers doctrine could be adopted through the ordinary legislative procedure.
Until a binding regulation is adopted, each EU institution can amend its own staff regulations to address the behavior of its own staff vis-à-vis lobbyists. Furthermore, the EU’s organs could change their own rules of procedure to regulate access of lobbyists to the premises of these organs. This might then have a factually binding character. Such effects could also be reached by the interinstituional agreement between Parliament and Commission in 2011.